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 Every corporate lawyer knows that insider trading in securities is illegal.  The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) bans insider trading under section 
10(b)1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 (“SEA”) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
thereunder.3  Although section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not specifically mention 
“insider trading,” the Supreme Court has upheld a private cause of action for trading 
on material, non-public information.4  What is not well known is that insider trading 
in commodities may be permissible in some circumstances.  Even though the lan-
guage of section 6b of the Commodity Exchange Act5 (“CEA”) tracks the language 
of its analogue statute in section 10(b) of the SEA, no similar cause of action for 
trading on inside information exists.  Moreover, although insider trading in com-
modities is prohibited in some circumstances, the rules governing such trading are 
too lenient and do not cover all traders.6
 There are some fundamental differences between securities and commodities 
that explain, in part, why they are regulated differently.  Securities, whether they be 
stocks or bonds, are often issued by public companies, such as McDonald’s or Procter 
& Gamble.  Directors, officers, and other insiders of these companies have time and 
place advantages in evaluating the company over other members of the public.  Given 
the position of the officers, for example, in implementing corporate policies and 
managing finances, they know before everyone else whether the company has a 
strong or weak outlook.
 Commodities are fundamentally different than stocks.  There is no CEO of oil 
or pork bellies or interest rates, as there is a CEO of ExxonMobil, for example.  The 
price of a commodity, like oil, is affected by three primary inputs: cash markets, 
traders, and regulators.7  Inside information about ExxonMobil’s operations may or 
may not change the price of oil in a predictable direction because there are many 
other oil companies competing with Exxon that also affect oil prices.  Furthermore, 
the activity of hedge funds and commodity exchange regulators is outside the knowl-
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).  Section 10(b) states that it shall be 
unlawful for any person “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . 
any manipulative or deceptive device . . . .”  Id.
2. The SEA primarily deals with trading and regulation in the secondary securities markets (as opposed to 
the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”), which primarily deals with the initial offer and sale of securities). 
Both the SEA and the 1933 Act prohibit manipulative and deceptive practices.  Marc I. Steinberg, 
Understanding Securities Law 1 (3d ed. 2001).
3. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).  Rule 10b-5 states: 
“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . .”  Id.
4. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
5. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (2006).  Section 6b(a)(2)(A) provides that it shall be unlawful 
“for any person, in or in connection with any order to make . . . any contract of sale of any commodity[,] 
to cheat or defraud . . . the other person[.]”; see also Fraud in Connection with Commodity Transactions, 
40 Fed. Reg. 26,504, 26,505 (June 24, 1975) (“The operative language of the anti-fraud provision 
contained in Section 4b [now 6b] of the Commodity Exchange Act . . . is no less broad than Rule 10b-5 
with respect to misrepresentations and deceptive acts and practices.”).
6. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.59 (2008).
7. See infra p. 620 for more information on these inputs.
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edge of any single CEO.  Similarly, if a hedge fund manager wants to buy a large 
block of oil contracts, it is extremely difficult to predict whether oil prices will rise 
because there are many other factors that influence oil prices.
 There is one category of market participants, though, that does have time and 
place advantages with respect to the cash market, trader, and regulator inputs. 
Governing members of commodities exchanges have information as to what regula-
tors are doing because they are the people passing rules for their exchanges.  In 
addition, governing members, through their auditing of market participants and 
their surveillance of the futures markets, also have access to trader information and 
cash market fundamentals.8  Because of their access to aggregated information, gov-
erning members consistently possess material, non-public information not available 
to other market participants.9
 Given the privileged position of governing members in the commodity trading 
scheme, it may seem surprising that they are regulated less vigorously than others in 
the commodity trading world.  This has been the case, however, since 1986, when 
the CFTC dipped its feet into the regulatory waters of insider trading with the pas-
sage of Regulation 1.59.10 
 This note will argue that CFTC Regulation 1.59’s existing ban on insider trading 
is insufficient.  Due to its lenient language, Regulation 1.59 is unlikely to deter in-
sider trading by governing members of commodities exchanges.  The rules passed by 
other commodities regulators, such as the National Futures Association (“NFA”) and 
the exchanges (i.e., the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”) and the New York 
Mercantile Exchange (“NYME”)), under the authority of Regulation 1.59, are simi-
larly ineffective.  Ineffective insider trading rules harm the commodities markets in 
two fundamental ways.  First, hedgers11 are favored at the expense of speculators.12 
This is problematic because speculators provide the liquidity necessary for a func-
tional commodities market.  Second, insider trading is fundamentally unfair. 
Unfairness can lead individuals and other market participants to stop trading on the 
commodities markets.  Consequently, this note argues that governing members of 
8. The CFTC contrasts the position of a governing member who has access to specific information 
concerning futures and cash market positions on both an individual and aggregate/market-wide basis 
with other market participants who have incomplete information.  Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n, A Study of the Nature, Extent and Effects of Futures Trading by Persons 
Possessing Material, Nonpublic Information app. VI, at 20–21 (Sept. 1984) [hereinafter Insider 
Trading Study].  For example, a broker who makes trades has information specific only to those 
transactions.  In the cash market, individual firms only have complete information about the cash and 
futures transactions of their own firms.  This information cannot become material until aggregated 
among several other cash market firms.  Id. at 85–86.
9. Id.
10. 17 C.F.R. § 1.59 (2008).
11. Hedgers take a position in a futures market opposite a position held in the cash market in order to 
reduce the risk from adverse price changes.  CFTC Glossary, http://www.cftc.gov/educationcenter/
glossary/index.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2008) [hereinafter CFTC Glossary].
12. A speculator is a person who does not hedge.  Rather, he seeks profit through successful anticipation of 
price movements.  Id.
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commodities exchanges should be banned from trading on the commodities mar-
kets.  
 This note consists of four parts.  Part II is separated into two sections.  Section 
A will provide an overview of futures regulation and Section B will provide a sum-
mary of the CFTC’s approach to insider trading.  Part III contains two sections as 
well.  Section A will show how the CFTC’s response to insider trading, through 
Regulation 1.59, falls short, and Section B will discuss why lax insider trading laws 
are a problem.  Part IV proposes that the CFTC redraft Regulation 1.59 to deal 
more aggressively with insider trading.  In particular, the redrafted regulation should 
ban commodities trading by governing members of commodities exchanges.  Part V 
concludes that the CFTC must also take action to enforce its new rule.
II. HISTORY
 A. Overview of Futures Regulation
 The CFTC is a federal regulatory body that regulates the commodities futures 
industry.13  Commodities that are traded include: grains, wheat, corn, rubber, sugar, 
crude oil, natural gas, gold, aluminum, interest rates, and index futures.14  In 2006, 
there were 11,859,266,610 futures and options contracts traded worldwide on com-
modities exchanges.15  The CME is the largest exchange by volume and alone traded 
1,101,712,533 contracts.16  There are twelve Designated Contract Markets17 
13. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2006) (granting the CFTC “exclusive jurisdiction . . . with respect to accounts, 
agreements . . . and transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery”).
14. See Mary Ann Burns, May Volume Pushes World Trading Past the 5 Billion Mark, Futures Industry, 
Sept./Oct. 2007, at 10.  Physical commodities in the agricultural, energy, and metal sectors did well 
between January and May 2007.  There were 48.30 million crude oil futures, 25.85 million corn futures, 
and 11.60 million soybean futures traded.  Id. at 13.  The interest rate sector, however, attracts much 
more trading activity, with 242.60 million Eurodollar futures, 134.94 million 10-Year T-Note futures, 
and 128.75 million E-mini S&P 500 Index futures traded between January and May 2007.  Id. at 12. 
Index derivatives attract even more volume than interest rate derivatives, with 787.11 million equity 
index futures and options traded globally between January and February 2006, representing 41.7% of 
total global volume during this period.  Rebecca Holz, A Remarkable Start in 2006, Futures Industry, 
May/June 2006, at 10, 10–11.
15. Galen Burghardt, Derivatives Exchange Volume Accelerates in 2006, Futures Industry, Mar./Apr. 2007, 
at 16, 16–17.  The number of contracts traded worldwide in 2006 grew by more than 30% over the 
previous year (there were 9,973,823,087 contracts traded in 2005).  Id. at 16.  With global futures and 
options volume reaching 4.6 billion contracts in the first four months of 2007, Cass Johnson, Global 
Futures and Options Volume Reaches 4.6 Billion Contracts in First Four Months of 2007, Futures Industry, 
July/Aug. 2007, at 8, 8–11, derivatives trading is on target to break 13 billion contracts for 2007.
16. Burghardt, supra note 15, at 28.  Remarkably, of the 1.1 billion contracts traded last year on the CME, 
over 500 million were Eurodollar contracts.  Id. at 18.
17. DCMs are boards of trade (exchanges) operating under the regulatory oversight of the CFTC.  CFTC 
Website, http://cftc.gov/industryoversight/tradingorganizations/designatedcontractmarkets/index.htm 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2008).  Under 7 U.S.C. § 7 (2006), a board of trade applying to the CFTC for 
designation as a DCM must meet several criteria, including prevention of market manipulation, 
establishment of rules for fair and equitable trading, establishment of a trade execution facility, and 
enforcement of rules through disciplinary procedures.
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(“DCMs”) regulated under the CFTC.18  The CFTC also has regulatory authority 
over eleven derivatives clearing organizations19 (“DCOs”).20  In addition, the CFTC 
regulates the activities of over 70,000 registrants, including associated persons21 
(54,258), commodity pool operators22 (1570), commodity trading advisors23 (2589), 
f loor brokers24 (8203), f loor traders25 (1512), futures commission merchants26 (210), 
and introducing brokers27 (1741).28
18. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, FY 2008 President’s Budget and Performance Plan  
(Feb. 2007) [hereinafter Budget and Performance Plan].  Some of the DCMs regulated by the 
CFTC include the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group (“CME Group”), CBOE Futures Exchange, 
LLL (“CFE”), Kansas City Board of Trade (“KCBT”), Minneapolis Grain Exchange (“MGE”), New 
York Board of Trade (“NYBOT”), and the New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”).  Id.
19. A DCO “is a clearinghouse . . . facility, system, or organization that . . . (i) enables each party to the 
agreement . . . the credit of the derivatives clearing organization . . . ; (ii) arranges or provides . . . for 
settlement or netting of obligations . . . ; or (iii) otherwise provides clearing services . . . .”  7 U.S.C. § 
1(a) (2006).
20. Budget and Performance Plan, supra note 18, at 7.  Some of these DCOs include the AE 
Clearinghouse, EnergyClear, HedgeStreet, CBOT, and NYMEX.  Id.
21. An associated person (“AP”) is a person who acts on behalf of a futures commission merchant (“FCM”), 
introducing broker (“IB”), commodity trade advisor (“CTA”), commodity pool operator (“CPO”), or an 
agricultural trade option merchant (“ATOM”).  APs solicit or accept orders and discretionary accounts, 
or participate in commodity pools.  APs also supervise individuals involved in these activities.  CFTC 
Glossary, supra note 11.
22. A CPO “means any person engaged in a business that is of the nature of an investment trust, syndicate, 
or similar form of enterprise, and who, in connection therewith, solicits, accepts, or receives from others, 
funds, securities, or property . . . for the purpose of trading in any commodity.”  7 U.S.C. § 1a(5) 
(2006).
23. A CTA “means any person who for compensation or profit, engages in the business of advising others 
. . . as to the value of or the advisability of trading in any contract of sale of a commodity.”  7 U.S.C. § 
1a(6)(A)(i)(I).
24. A floor broker (“FB”) means any “person with exchange trading privileges who, in any pit . . . provided 
by an exchange for the meeting of persons similarly engaged, executes for another person any orders for 
the purchse or sale of any commodity for future delivery.”  CFTC Glossary, supra note 11.
25. A floor trader (“FT”) means any “person with exchange trading privileges who executes his own trades 
by being personally present in the pit or ring for futures trading.”  Id.
26. A futures commission merchant (“FCM”) means“[i]ndividuals, associations, partnerships, corporations, 
and trusts that solicit or accept orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery on 
or subject to the rules of any exchange and that accept payment from or extend credit to those whose 
orders are accepted.”  Id.
27. An introducing broker (“IB”) is any 
   person (other than a person registered as an associated person of a futures commission 
merchant) who is engaged in soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any 
commodity for future delivery on an exchange who does not accept any money, securities, 
or property to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result therefrom.
 Id.
28. Budget and Performance Plan, supra note 18, at 4.
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 As of 2003, there were an estimated 500 actively traded futures29 and options30 
contracts over the 15 DCMs.31  Moreover, the diversity of contracts traded over the 
commodities exchanges is vast.  Some of the products include U.S. Treasury Notes 
(five year), live cattle, black tiger shrimp, cheddar cheese, Goldman Sachs Commodity 
Index, and the LIBOR.32  Despite the large variety of products traded over the com-
modities exchanges, trading in the commodities market is concentrated primarily in 
interest rates and equity prices.  According to the Futures Industry Association 
(“FIA”), “90% of all trading in exchange-traded derivatives is tied to interest rates or 
equity prices.”33
 Federal regulation of derivatives began with the passage of the Future Trading 
Act of 192134 (“the Act”).35  The Act sought to prevent price manipulation, such as 
excessive speculation in grain prices.36  To this end, it imposed a prohibitive tax on 
the trading of grain futures not undertaken through an authorized exchange desig-
nated by the secretary of agriculture, termed a “board of trade.”37  In order to qualify 
29. A “futures contract” is 
   an agreement to purchase or sell a commodity for delivery in the future: (1) at a price that 
is determined at initiation of the contract; (2) that obligates each party to the contract to 
fulfill the contract at the specified price; (3) that is used to assume or shift price risk; and 
(4) that may be satisfied by delivery or offset.
 CFTC Glossary, supra note 11.
30. Under 7 U.S.C. § 1a(26), an option means “an agreement, contract, or transaction that is of the character 
of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an ‘option.’”  The online CFTC glossary provides a more 
helpful definition: “A contract that gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a 
specified quantity of a commodity or other instrument at a specific price within a specified period of 
time, regardless of the market price of that instrument.”  CFTC Glossary, supra note 11.
31. Budget and Performance Plan, supra note 18, at 6.  The number of registered boards of trade 
f luctuates from year to year.  For example, there were fourteen DCMs in 2001 and eighteen DCMs in 
2004.  In 2003, there were fifteen DCMs.  Id.
32. Futures and Options Contracts Designated by the Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 
Div. of Econ. Analysis (1999).  LIBOR is an abbreviation for London Interbank Offered Rate.  The 
CFTC glossary defines LIBOR as “[t]he rate of interest at which banks borrow funds from other banks, 
in marketable size, in the London interbank market.  LIBOR rates are disseminated by the British 
Bankers Association.”  CFTC Glossary, supra note 11.
33. Burghardt, supra note 15, at 16.  A derivative is a 
   financial instrument, traded on or off an exchange, the price of which is directly dependent 
upon . . . the value of one or more underlying . . . commodities . . . . Derivatives involve the 
trading of rights or obligations based on the underlying product, but do not directly transfer 
property.  Derivatives include futures, options, and swaps.
 CFTC Glossary, supra note 11.
34. Future Trading Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-66, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187, invalidated by Hill v. Wallace, 259 
U.S. 44 (1922) (holding that the act could not be sustained under Congress’ taxing power).
35. See Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation, 14 Yale J. on Reg. 279, 
285 (1997).
36. Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 970 (4th Cir. 1993).
37. Future Trading Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-66, §§ 4–5; see also 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(2) (2006) (“The term 
‘board of trade’ means any organized exchange or other trading facility.”).
605
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 53 | 2008/09
for authorization, the board of trade had to comply with several statutory conditions, 
including transaction record-keeping, preventing price manipulation, and main-
taining a recognized, official weighing, and inspection service.38
 The Future Trading Act of 1921 proved to be short-lived.  The Act was declared 
unconstitutional in Hill v. Wallace as an improper exercise of the taxing power.39  The 
Act imposed a tax of 20 cents per bushel on all contracts for the sale of grain for fu-
ture delivery if the sales were not made through a designated board of trade.40
 With the passage of the Grain Futures Act of 1922,41 Congress achieved its goal 
of preventing market manipulation by utilizing the Commerce Clause, as opposed to 
its taxing power.42  As the successor to the Future Trading Act of 1921, the 1922 Act 
was substantially similar.43  Section 5 still provided that boards of trade had to meet 
certain qualifications, and the secretary of agriculture had the power to designate 
boards of trade as contract markets.44  However, instead of indirectly preventing fu-
tures trading on unregulated contract markets with a prohibitive tax, the 1922 Act 
explicitly banned such trading.45
 Following the 1921 and 1922 Acts, the next major congressional initiative regu-
lating derivatives was the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (“CEA”).46  The CEA 
overhauled the 1922 Act by adding several new sections.47  The new Act expanded 
upon the 1921 Act by increasing the secretary of agriculture’s authority.  The Act 
now made it unlawful to engage in commodity brokering without first registering 
with the secretary.48  The secretary also had the power to revoke a board of trade’s 
designation as a contract market.49  In order to prevent sudden fluctuations in com-
modity prices, the Commodity Exchange Commission50 could set speculative 
38. Future Trading Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-66, § 5 (a)–(d).
39. Hill, 259 U.S. at 68.  The case was a suit brought by eight members of the Board of Trade in Chicago 
against Henry Wallace, the Secretary of Agriculture.  Id. at 45; see also 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (mentioning 
in the notes that “The Futures [sic] Trading Act” was declared unconstitutional, at least in part, in Hill 
v. Wallace); Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d at 970.
40. Future Trading Act, Pub. L. No. 67-66, § 4; Hill, 259 U.S. at 63.
41. Grain Futures Act of 1922, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998, amended by Commodity Exchange Act, 49 Stat. 1491 
(current version at 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
42. See In re Grain Land Coop, No. 97-1, 1998 CFTC LEXIS 270, at *59–63 (Nov. 6, 1998).
43. See Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998.
44. See id. at 1000.
45. Grain Futures Act, § 4.  The constitutionality of the Grain Futures Act was upheld in Chi. Bd. of 
Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
46. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1 
(2006)).
47. See CEA §§ 5, 7, 9, 49 Stat. at 1492–1500 (adding sections 4a–i, 5a–b, 6a–b).
48. CEA § 5, 49 Stat. at 1492–97.
49. CEA § 7, 49 Stat. at 1498.
50. The Commodity Exchange Commission was the successor to the Grain Futures Commission.  See U.S. 
Nat. Archives & Records Admin., Records of the Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, http://www.
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position limits on trading.51  In addition, the CEA extended regulatory coverage of 
commodities beyond grain to include cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, f laxseed, 
grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, and Irish potatoes.52
 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 (“CFTCA”) estab-
lished the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), which was granted 
exclusive authority to regulate futures contracts.53  The CFTC is now an indepen-
dent agency separate from the Department of Agriculture.54  Regulation of U.S. 
financial markets was divided between the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”), with authority over securities, and the CFTC, with authority over futures.55 
The CFTCA gave powers to the CFTC that the SEC56 did not have at the time. 
For example, “the CFTC could impose civil penalties of up to $100,000 per viola-
tion, bar violators from trading on contract markets, and grant reparations to investors 
injured by [CEA violators].”57
 The 1974 CFTCA also authorized the creation of “registered futures 
associations.”58  This legislation led to the establishment of the National Futures 
Association (“NFA”), a nationwide self-regulatory organization59 (“SRO”), for the 
futures industry, in 1982.60  Under CFTC oversight, the NFA passes rules,61 per-
forms audits and examinations to ensure compliance with the rules, takes disciplinary 
actions against firms and individuals who violate the rules, and provides a forum for 
arbitration and mediation of disputes.62  Membership with the NFA is mandatory for 
those who wish to conduct business on U.S. futures exchanges.63
archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/180.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2008).
51. CEA § 5, 49 Stat. at 1492.
52. CEA § 3(a), 49 Stat. at 1941.
53. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2) (2006).
54. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389, 1414.
55. Id. at 1395 (stating the CFTC will not supersede any SEC authorities or duties unless it is necessary to 
carry out its authority as it pertains to futures).
56. The SEC, created in 1934, is a federal agency charged with the administration and enforcement of 
federal securities law.  Steinberg, supra note 2, at 2.
57. Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives Regulation in 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 Brook. J. Int’l L. 319, 348–49 (2003) (citing to 7 
U.S.C. §§ 9, 9, & 18, respectively).
58. 7 U.S.C. § 21 (2006); see also National Futures Association Website, http://www.nfa.futures.org/
aboutnfa/indexAbout.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2008) [hereinafter NFA Website].
59. The online CFTC glossary defines SROs as “[e]xchanges and registered futures associations that 
enforce financial and sales practice requirements for their members.”  CFTC Glossary, supra note 11.
60. NFA Website, supra note 58.
61. NFA rules cover areas such as advertising, risk disclosure, discretionary trading, disclosure of fees, 
minimum capital requirements, and reporting and proficiency testing.  Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.  The CFTC has delegated its power to register commodity market participants to the NFA.  There 
are more than 4200 firms and 55,000 associates registered with the NFA.  Id.
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 The futures exchanges, such as the CME and the NYMEX, along with the 
NFA, have the most direct responsibility for regulating market participants.64 
However, the CFTC retains oversight of the rule enforcement programs of the fu-
tures exchanges and the NFA.65  Each year, the CFTC publishes Rule Enforcement 
Reviews of Designated Contract Markets (e.g., futures exchanges) where the CFTC 
examines trade practices and offers conclusions and recommendations.66  For ex-
ample, in 2006, the CFTC reviewed the CME and the Kansas City Board of Trade 
(“KCBT”), and in 2005, the CFTC reviewed the New York Board of Trade 
(“NYBOT”), the Chicago Board of Trade (“CBOT”), and OneChicago.67 
 B. Overview of the CFTC’s Approach to Insider Trading
 In its mission statement, the CFTC describes its main purposes as preventing 
fraud and promoting competition: “The CFTC’s mission is to protect market users 
and the public from fraud, manipulation, and abusive practices related to the sale of 
commodity and financial futures and options, and to foster open, competitive, and 
financially sound futures and option markets.”68
 In the 1970s and 1980s, there were a number of incidents involving commodities 
trading that were perceived as insider trading69 abuses.70  One event that concerned 
64. See Susan C. Ervin, OTC Derivative Markets and Their Regulation: Working Paper on 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n Regulatory Framework, Report of the Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n (Oct. 1993).
65. Id.
66. See U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, Rule Enforcement Reviews of Designated Contract 
Markets, http://www.cftc.gov/industryoversight/tradingorganizations/designatedcontractmarkets/
dcmruleenf.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2008).
67. Id.  In 2006, the CFTC’s Division of Market Oversight conducted a rule enforcement review of the 
CME.  In a f ifty-nine page report, Market Oversight summarized its f indings and made 
recommendations.  It audited four areas: audit trail, trade practice surveillance, disciplinary program, 
and dispute resolution program.  The CFTC found that all of these areas were adequate and offered no 
recommendations.  CFTC, Div. of Mkt. Oversight, Rule Enforcement Review of the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange 3, 3–5 (2006), http://www.cftc.gov/f iles/tm/tmrer-cme102606.pdf 
[hereinafter Div. of Mkt. Oversight].  In contrast, the Division of Market Oversight’s 2006 Rule 
Enforcement Review of KCBT found some inadequacies with the KCBT’s audit trail.  One suggestion 
by Market Oversight was to encrypt the trade data back-up tapes taken off-site each night or alternatively 
deposit the trade data back-up tapes in a secure off-site location.  CFTC, Div. of Mkt. Oversight, 
Rule Enforcement Review of the Kansas City Board of Trade (2006), http://www.cftc.gov/
files/tm/tmrer-kcbt061606-14final.pdf.
68. CFTC, About the CFTC, http://www.cftc.gov/aboutthecftc/index.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2008) 
[hereinafter About the CFTC].
69. The term “insider trading” will be used in this paper for brevity’s sake.  The CFTC, however, refers to 
insider trading as trading on material, non-public information.  See, e.g., Insider Trading Study, supra 
note 8, at 1.
70. See, e.g., id. at 32–38 (analyzing the 1972 sale of wheat to the Soviet Union, trading in live cattle futures, 
and events in the silver markets in 1979–80 as potential abuses of material, non-public information).
608
CFTC REGULATION
Congress was the 1972 sale of wheat to the Soviet Union.71  In April 1972, represen-
tatives of the U.S. State Department visited the U.S.S.R. to discuss possible grain 
sales.72  In July 1972, the U.S. government entered into an agreement to export 
“roughly 434 million bushels of wheat and at least 291 million bushels of feed grains 
and soybeans to the U.S.S.R.”73  As a result of this deal’s “size and commercial im-
portance,” the wheat futures market was dramatically affected.74  In the wake of the 
State Department meeting there was a dramatic increase in wheat futures, which led 
to a general concern that certain government officials privy to this information (in 
this case, State Department officials) traded on wheat futures.75
 As a result of similar events during the 1970s and 1980s,76 the industry became 
concerned with abusive trading practices in the commodities markets.  In 1982, 
Congress mandated the CFTC to do a detailed study into the “nature, extent, and 
effects” of insider trading.77  In September 1984, the CFTC issued its report on in-
sider trading to the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and 
the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate.78  The CFTC 
identified four types of traders who may potentially engage in insider trading: gov-
ernment employees who obtain information from their workplace,79 employees of 
71. Id. at 32–34.
72. Id. at 33.
73. Id.
74. Id.  For example, “the July 1972 trading volume of wheat futures trading on the [KCBT] was more than 
triple that of June 1972 and nearly double that of July 1971.”  Id.  “[T]he Kansas City cash price of hard 
red winter wheat rose from $1.44¼ per bushel on June 27, 1972, to $2.26½ per bushel on September 25, 
1972.”  Id. at 34.
75. See id. at 32.  The Insider Trading Report noted that there was no actual evidence of insider trading in 
wheat futures.  Id.
76. As noted above, there were concerns about potential insider trading in live cattle futures.  U.S. 
Congressman Neal Smith stated at a February 27, 1981 press conference that the market for live cattle 
futures was open to trading abuses.  Representative Smith stated that “the market is very thin and 
therefore a few insiders, by trading on their knowledge of their firms’ trades, could affect the live cattle 
futures’ prices.”  Id. at 35–36.
77. Id. at 1.  The CFTC noted that the insider trading study was prompted by concerns regarding instances 
such as the 1972 sale of wheat to the Soviet Union.  Id. at 32.
78. See id. at cover page.
79. By government employees, the CFTC is referring to employees of information generators and market 
regulators.  Id. at 89.
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futures SROs,80 individuals who trade as agents,81 and employees of cash and futures 
firms.82
 The CFTC made several additional findings.  First, although futures transac-
tions, unlike securities transactions, are generally not firm-specific, there is still 
information in the market that may be material and non-public.83  With respect to 
government employees, the CFTC concluded that existing laws were sufficient to 
deter insider trading.84  For employees of futures SROs,85 the CFTC noted that 
many futures SROs had already adopted restrictions in this type of trading.86  The 
CFTC, nonetheless, stated that it intended to pass its own rule requiring futures 
SROs to adopt insider trading rules that met basic, specified standards.87  For f loor 
brokers and other fiduciaries (i.e., those trading as agents), the CFTC noted defi-
ciencies in the current laws and stated that it intended to propose a new rule.88  Lastly, 
80. By SROs, the CFTC was referring to employees of “exchanges, clearinghouses, and any industry-wide 
organizations, that have quasi-governmental functions.”  Id. at 88.  The CFTC noted: “It is common for 
employees of futures self-regulatory organizations to be exposed to confidential information of a market-
sensitive nature in the course of their official responsibilities.”  Id. at 94.
81. Broadly classified as market professionals, this group of people includes f loor brokers and “others in the 
trading chain” who have a fiduciary duty to the customer. Id. at 102.
82. Id. at 2.
83. Id. at 7.
84. Id. at 8.  The CFTC noted that the high ethical standards expected of government employees forbidding 
them from personally profiting from the conduct of their official duties amounted to strict liability 
restrictions.  Id. at 88.  The CFTC noted several statutes that preclude government employees from 
insider trading, including: 18 U.S.C. § 1905, a criminal statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7301, from the Code of 
Ethics for Government Service, and 18 U.S.C. § 1902, a specific prohibition on the release of crop 
reports.  Id. at 90–91 nn. 2–4.
85. The CFTC gave several examples of employees.  On a commodities exchange, there are
   members of the compliance and audit staffs [who] are privy at times to [financial data 
about] individual firms; market surveillance staffs [who often] possess information about 
the market position of large traders; staff associated with the Board of Governors or 
Business Conduct Committee [who] at times know about [non-public] exchange decisions; 
and clerks and typists [who often] handle documents [with] sensitive [market 
information].
 Id. at 94.
86. Id. at 8–9.  Some of the restrictions that many commodities exchanges had adopted included prohibitions 
against various forms of employee trading.  See, e.g., CFTC Notice, 47 Fed. Reg. 7300 (Feb. 18, 1982) 
(discussing a proposed rule that would have barred insider trading by employees).
87. Insider Trading Study, supra note 8, at 9.
88. Id. at 9–10.  The CFTC noted that f loor brokers or other fiduciaries may engage in dual trading, a 
practice where a f loor broker or other fiduciary trades on his own account while having concurrent 
knowledge of the customer orders they are filling.  Id.  The CFTC noted that although “Commission 
and exchange rules require . . . f loor brokers [to] execute customers’ orders before trading for their own 
accounts, many exchanges ha[d] deficiencies in their trade reconstruction systems that [made it difficult 
for exchanges to enforce these rules].  Id.
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although the CFTC noted that trading by directors, officers, and employees of cash 
and futures firms could lead to abuses, no change to the law was recommended.89
 This note will focus on the CFTC’s actions following the release of the insider 
trading study with regard to the second class of traders, namely, employees of futures 
SROs.  Employees include members of the compliance and audit staffs, market sur-
veillance staff, staff associated with the Board of Governors or Business Conduct 
Committee, and clerks and typists.90
 Following the insider trading study, in 1986 the CFTC adopted Regulation 1.59 
to tackle the problem of SRO employees engaging in insider trading.  Regulation 
1.59, titled “Activities of self-regulatory organization employees, governing board 
members, committee members, and consultants,” prohibits these classes of people 
from trading on material, non-public information.91  The regulation defines material 
information as “information which, if such information were publicly known, would 
be considered important by a reasonable person in deciding whether to trade a par-
ticular commodity.”92  Non-public information is defined as “information which has 
not been disseminated in a manner which makes it generally available to the public.”93 
While a cursory glance at section 1.59(a) leads to the conclusion that it unequivocally 
prohibits insider trading (i.e., no trading on material, non-public information by any 
employee), a reading of the whole regulation shows that by dividing commodities 
exchange employees into two classes the CFTC has left a loophole.
III. PROBLEM
 A. Regulation 1.59 Fails to Adequately Regulate Harmful Insider Trading
 Regulation 1.59 fails to prohibit harmful insider trading for several reasons. 
First, the rules restricting insider trading are ambiguous.  Regulation 1.59 creates 
two classes of potential traders: (1) governing board members,94 which include com-
89. Id. at 10.  The CFTC decided not to recommend any legislative changes to Congress based on the 
research of the insider trading study and the lack of evidence regarding this type of insider trading.  Id. 
Specifically, the CFTC found that information available to cash and futures firms concerning aggregate 
supply and demand was normally incomplete.  Id. at 86.  Individual firms typically have specific cash 
and futures information about transactions of their own firms.  Id.  This information, however, does not 
become material unless it is aggregated with the cash and futures information of several other cash and 
futures firms.  Id.
90. See id. at 94.
91. 17 C.F.R. § 1.59 (2008).
92. Id. § 1.59(a)(5).  The regulation provides examples of “material information” as including “information 
relating to present or anticipated cash, futures, or options positions, trading strategies, the financial 
condition of members of self-regulatory organizations . . . or their customers . . . or the regulatory 
actions or proposed regulatory actions of a self-regulatory organization.”  Id.
93. Id. § 1.59(a)(6).
94. “Governing board member means a member, or functional equivalent thereof, of the board of governors 
of a self-regulatory organization.”  Id. § 1.59(a)(2).  The CME has a board of directors consisting of 
thirty-one members.  CME Website, http://investor.cmegroup.com/directors.cfm (last visited Sept. 27, 
2008) [hereinafter CME Website].  The management team of the CME consists of eleven members 
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mittee members95 and consultants,96 and (2) employees.97  Governing members98 
must meet less stringent requirements than employees to avoid restrictions on insider 
trading.99  This bifurcation signals to governing members that the real targets of the 
insider trading regulations are the lower level exchange employees, not themselves. 
This belief is reinforced by CFTC Releases regarding Regulation 1.59, which mani-
fest a clear intent to maintain a less restrictive insider trading standard for governing 
members.100  From a policy perspective, this rule seems backwards.  Prohibiting the 
appearance of impropriety seems like an objective that should start from the top 
down, not the other way around.
including a CEO, president, managing director, general counsel and corporate secretary, managing 
director and chief corporate development officer.  Id.  It is unclear from the language of Regulation 
1.59(a)(2) whether the eleven members of the management team are considered “governing board 
members.”  The only person of the eleven member management team who is also on the board of 
directors is Craig S. Donohue, the CEO.  Id.  Clearly, he is considered a governing board member.  It is 
unclear, however, whether the other ten members of the management team are also considered governing 
board members.  The titles of the officers suggest that they indeed are the equivalent of board members. 
Except for the CEO and the president, the titles of the other eight officers are proceeded by the name 
managing director (e.g., managing director and chief financial officer).  Id.
95. “Committee member means a member, or functional equivalent thereof, of any committee of a self-
regulatory organization.”  17 C.F.R. § 1.59(a)(3).  The CME has nine committees: an Audit Committee, 
Compensation Committee, Executive Committee, Finance Committee, Governance Committee, 
Market Regulation Oversight Committee, Market & Public Relations Advisory Committee, 
Nominating Committee, and a Strategic Steering Committee.  CME Website, supra note 94.
96. The term “consultant” is undefined in the regulation.  The CFTC noted that Barron’s Business Guides 
define consultant as an “individual or organization providing professional advice to an organization for 
a fee[;] [a] consultant is an independent contractor.”  Final Rules Concerning Amendments to Insider 
Trading Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 47,843 n.11 (Aug. 4, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1) (quoting 
Barron’s Dictionary of Business Terms 120 (2d ed. 1994)).  Noting that the terms consultant and 
employee can be difficult to distinguish, the CFTC stated that it is the obligation of the futures SRO to 
decide who is an “employee” and who is a “consultant.”  Id. at 47,846.  The CFTC stated that consultants 
should be held to the more narrow standard of governing members (rather than the absolute ban on 
trading in any commodity interest on the contracting futures SRO) because most consultants do not 
gain access to insider information.  The CFTC reasoned that in contrast to employees, the relationship 
between consultants and their futures SROs is generally attenuated.  Id.
97. “Employee means any person hired or otherwise employed on a salaried or contract basis by a self-
regulatory organization, but does not include: (i) Any governing board member . . . ; (ii) Any committee 
member . . . ; or (iii) Any consultant . . . .”  17 C.F.R. § 1.59(a)(4).  Positions for employees of a futures 
SRO include administrative and support services, business development and strategy, clearing, finance/
accounting/internal audit, human resources, legal/market regulation, marketing/PR/communications, 
operations, products and services/sales, and technology.  See, e.g., CME Website, Job Openings, http://
www.cme.com/about/careers/index.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
98. Hereinafter, the term “governing members,” will include board members, committee members, and 
consultants.
99. See infra pp. 613–14.
100. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 1.59.  Following the initial passage of Regulation 1.59, there have been three 
interpretive releases: on Dec. 29, 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 48,977, on Oct. 25, 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,973, and 
on Aug. 4, 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 47,847.
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 The second reason Regulation 1.59 is insufficient in preventing harmful insider 
trading is that it has not effectively been implemented by the NFA and commodities 
exchanges and clearing organizations, as Regulation 1.59 requires.101  The NFA does 
not have enough direct authority over governing members to prevent insider trad-
ing.102  Consequently, the commodities exchanges are primarily responsible for 
enforcing the CFTC’s insider trading regulation.  However, the CME and NYMEX, 
two key futures exchanges, do not adequately implement Regulation 1.59 either. 
The CME only broadly prohibits insider trading in its employee handbook, not in its 
rulebook.  This means that the maximum punishment for an employee who breaches 
insider trading laws is termination of employment.  Similarly, the NYMEX rule 
implements only the minimum requirements of Regulation 1.59 which, as explained 
above, creates a dual standard of conduct between governing members and em-
ployees.
 B. The Scope of Regulation 1.59 Is Too Narrow
 In the 1984 insider trading report, the CFTC noted that it could fix the inef-
fectiveness of section 6b, the general anti-fraud provision of the CEA, by passing a 
regulation specifically prohibiting insider trading.103  Two years after the 1984 in-
sider trading report was issued, the CFTC indeed did pass an insider trading 
regulation targeting employees of futures SROs.104  However, as a result of the 
CFTC’s intention to maintain a less restrictive insider trading standard for gov-
erning members than employees, Regulation 1.59 left open the potential for insider 
trading by governing members.105
 Regulation 1.59 differentiates between two groups of insiders under sections 
1.59(b) and 1.59(c).106  Section 1.59(b) applies to employees of futures SROs, and 
section 1.59(c) applies to governing members.107  While section 1.59(d), titled 
“Prohibited conduct,” provides a blanket prohibition on insider trading that applies 
to all industry participants (i.e., employees of futures SROs and the governing mem-
101. The commodities exchanges act as both exchanges and clearing organizations.  See Robert J. Aalberts & 
Percy S. Poon, Derivatives and the Modern Prudent Investor Rule: Too Risky or Too Necessary?, 67 Ohio 
St. L.J. 525, 548 (2006).  Consequently, hereinafter the term “exchanges” will refer to both the 
exchanges and the clearing organizations.
102. See infra pp. 615–16 for more information about the NFA’s powers.
103. See supra p. 600.
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bers of futures SROs),108 section 1.59(c) provides less stringent restrictions on insider 
trading for governing members than section 1.59(b) provides for employees.109
 Specifically, section 1.59(c) provides that no governing member “shall use or 
disclose—for any purpose other than the performance of official duties . . . material, 
non-public information obtained as a result of such person’s official duties.”110  In 
contrast, sections 1.59(b)(1)(i)(A) and (B), which govern employee conduct, provide 
that each futures SRO must maintain, in effect, rules that prohibit employees of the 
futures SRO from “[t]rading, directly or indirectly, in any commodity interest traded 
on or cleared by the employing contract market . . . in any related commodity 
interest.”111  Section 1.59(b)(1)(i)(C) goes further, stating that the employee cannot 
even trade on another commodities exchange.112  The regulation states that futures 
SROs should have these rules in place “at a minimum.”113
 In the CFTC’s 2000 Amendment to Regulation 1.59,114 the CFTC explicitly 
states that the employee ban on trading is absolute: “Specifically, employees are abso-
lutely prohibited in trading in any commodity interest . . . .”115  In the same release, 
the CFTC explained that governing members are subject to less stringent standards 
because the CFTC values their expertise and does not want to discourage their ser-
vice.116
108. Section 1.59(d)(1)(i) provides that no employee, governing board member, committee member, or 
consultant shall trade for his own account on the basis of material, non-public information.  Section 
1.59(d)(1)(ii) provides that these participants shall not disclose any material, non-public information for 
any purpose inconsistent with their duties.  Finally, section 1.59(d)(2) disallows any person who has 
received material, non-public information from an industry participant in breach of their fiduciary 
duties from trading on the commodity.
109. 17 C.F.R. § 1.59.
110. Id. § 1.59(c).
111. Id. § 1.59(b)(1)(i)(A) and (B).
112. Id. § 1.59(b)(i)(C).  This rule means that an employee of the CME cannot trade any commodities on the 
NYMEX (an exchange that is not regulated by the CME) if he has access to material, non-public 
information on NYMEX commodities (e.g., natural gas, heating oil, or light sweet crude oil).
113. Id. § 1.59(b)(1).
114. The CFTC passed this amendment to clarify that governing board members, committee members, and 
consultants are not employees.  Final Rules Concerning Amendments to Insider Trading Regulation, 
65 Fed. Reg. 47,843, 47,844 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1).
115. Id.
116. Id.  It is surprising that a commodities exchange like the CME would have difficulty attracting talent if 
governing members were more restricted in their trading capabilities.  According to Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange Holdings Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF14A) 36, 43 (Mar. 10, 2006), available 
at http://investor.cmegroup.com/investor-relations/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1193125-06-51032, the 
2005 compensation for Craig S. Donohue, the CEO of the CME, was a $700,000 salary and a $951,510 
bonus, totaling $1,651,510 for the year.  This 1.65 million dollar figure does not include Donohue’s 
$327,535 restricted stock compensation or his additional $193,254 compensation to his 401(k), pension, 
supplemental plan, and SERP contribution.  It should additionally be noted that Mr. Donohue and the 
other directors and executive officers of the CME (totaling thirty-one people as a group) collectively 
own 481,251 (or 1.38%) of the Class A shares and thirty-three (or 1.94%) of the Class B shares.  At a 
closing price of $210.60 on May 25, 2005, for Class A shares, thirty-one people owned $101,351,460.60 
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 This position is consistent with the 1986 release adopting section 1.59,117 in 
which the CFTC deleted the portion of the regulation that restricted trading by 
governing members until further comments could be raised and addressed.118  The 
CFTC took notice of several criticisms of the proposal based on letters from various 
industry groups.119  These groups argued, among other things, that the regulation 
prohibits more trading than is necessary to maintain the integrity of the market, that 
it would be difficult to enforce, and that governing members should be given the op-
portunity to excuse themselves from discussions that could affect the market.120
 While asserting that its goal in regulating governing members is to “detect and 
deter violations,” the CFTC has continued to maintain its lax position toward gov-
erning members, citing its desire to hold on to talented employees in these important 
positions.121  In the 2000 release, the CFTC stated that “[t]he possession of material, 
non-public information . . . does not bar these individuals [governing members] from 
trading commodity interests.”122  This statement specifically gives to governing 
members that which it forbids to employees—namely, the right to trade commodity 
interests on another futures SRO or a linked commodities exchange.123
 The language and CFTC interpretation of Regulation 1.59 are both ambiguous. 
On one hand, the language seems absolute with respect to governing members (i.e., 
trading is prohibited on their own account or for or on behalf of any account).  On 
the other hand, the CFTC explicitly states that governing members are not abso-
lutely barred from trading, as is the case with employees.  This ambiguity is even 
more disturbing in light of the fact that the futures SROs have neither passed strin-
gent rules of their own nor enforced their own rules to restrict insider trading.
worth of stock.  Donohue, with 94,390 Class A shares, owned $19,878,534 of CME stock as of May 25, 
2005.  Id. at 18, 24–26.  Class B shares confer certain voting powers.  Id. at 28, 34.
117. Activities of Self-Regulatory Organization Employees Who Possess Material, Nonpublic Information, 
51 Fed. Reg. 44,866 (Dec. 12, 1986) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1) [hereinafter Activities of SRO 
Employees].
118. Id. at 44,866.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 44,868.
121. In the 1986 release, the CFTC stated that, in consideration of opposition by governing members to 
further restricting their trading capabilities, it “has determined that the proposal restricting the activities 
of governing members merits further deliberation and possible amendment.”  Id.  In the 2000 release, 
the CFTC completely ignored its pledge to deliberate on regulating governing members.  The 2000 
release, instead of discussing further prohibitions on insider trading by governing members, is silent on 
this issue.  Rather, the release makes clear that governing members are not to be considered “employees” 
(if governing members were considered “employees,” they would be subject to more stringent insider 
trading prohibitions).  Final Rules Concerning Amendments to Insider Trading Regulation, 65 Fed. 
Reg. at 47,844.
122. Id. at 47,844.
123. 17 C.F.R. § 1.59.
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 C. Regulation 1.59 Has Not Been Implemented by the NFA, Commodities   
  Exchanges, and Clearing Organizations As Regulation 1.59 Requires
 Regulation 1.59(b), which applies to employees of futures SROs, and Regulation 
1.59(c), which applies to governing members, state that each futures SRO must 
maintain rules against insider trading.124  The CFTC, with its limited budget and 
resources, delegates a great degree of regulatory authority to the futures SROs in this 
area.125  Consequently, this means that if the futures SROs are not regulating or en-
forcing rules against insider trading, then insider trading will go unpunished. 
 The rulebooks of the NFA, the CME, and NYMEX126 lack sufficient prohibi-
tions against insider trading.  Under NFA Rule 2-2, titled “Fraud and Related 
Matters,” the NFA provides that “[n]o Member or Associate shall cheat, defraud or 
deceive, or attempt to cheat, defraud or deceive, any commodity futures customer.”127 
This general rule is strikingly similar to the language of section 6b of the CEA, 
which provides that:
It shall be unlawful for [any member of a registered entity] . . . for or on 
behalf of any other person . . . in or in connection with an order to make . . . 
any contract of sale of any commodity . . . to cheat or defraud or attempt to 
cheat or defraud such other person[.]128
Because NFA Rule 2-2 states that it is unlawful to cheat a customer, rather than the 
market as a whole, the NFA’s prohibition on insider trading does not accomplish the 
goals of Regulation 1.59.129
 NFA Rule 3-1, titled “Department of Compliance,” provides a better solution 
than NFA Rule 2-2.  This compliance rule specifically prohibits insider trading, as 
opposed to NFA Rule 2-2, which is a general anti-fraud provision.  Also, NFA Rule 
3-1, unlike the CFTC’s Regulation 1.59, is not limited to different categories of 
market participants.  In fact, NFA officers and employees are banned from insider 
trading.  NFA Rule 3-1(b) provides that, “[e]xcept with the President’s approval, the 
Compliance Director and any employee of the Compliance Department shall not 
trade, directly or indirectly, any commodity interest.”130  The inclusion of the compli-
ance director in the same sentence as “any employee” implies that the ban on insider 
124. Id.
125. CFTC, FY 2008 President’s Budget and Performance Plan 43, at 58 (2007).  The CFTC’s 2008 
fiscal year budget estimate is $116 million.  Id.  Of this figure, only $30,262,000 goes to the Division of 
Enforcement.  Id.
126. The CME and the NYMEX are both commodities exchanges and derivative clearing organizations 
(DCOs).  See supra text accompanying note 19.
127. NFA Compliance Rules, 2-2, available at http://nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/manualCompliance.
asp#2-2.
128. CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a) (2006).
129. See supra Part III (explaining why section 6b does not work to prohibit insider trading by governing 
members).
130. NFA Compliance Rules, 3-1, available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/printerFriendly.asp?tag=3-1b.
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trading applies equally to both groups.  Furthermore, the CFTC noted in its insider 
trading study (published before Regulation 1.59 was adopted) that the NFA already 
had rules in place that prohibit NFA officers and employees from insider trading 
without proper approval of a superior.131
 The NFA, because of its enforcement authority, certainly has the capacity to 
deter insider trading.  For example, in an NFA regulatory action against Calvary 
Financial Group, the agency charged the company with several violations of NFA 
Compliance Rules, including such violations as churning customers’ accounts, placing 
unauthorized trades in customers’ accounts, and making deceptive, misleading, and 
high-pressured sales solicitations.132  As a result of these violations, Calvary was 
banned from ever again re-applying for NFA membership or CFTC registration in 
any capacity.133  The NFA, in addition to its powers to deny, revoke, suspend, re-
strict, or condition any market participant’s registration, can also fine up to $250,000 
per violation.134  Moreover, the NFA often collaborates with the CFTC and the FBI 
when bringing charges against firms or individuals.135
 The problem with NFA Rule 3-1(b) is that it is not enforced.  The NFA online 
database of regulatory actions, dating back to 1996, shows that the NFA has en-
forced many of its rules, including Compliance Rules 2-4, 2-5, 2-6, 2-8, 2-29, 2-30, 
and 2-38.  Compliance Rule 3-1, however, does not appear in the NFA database of 
regulatory actions.136  In fact, the NFA has never brought any kind of action under 
this rule against one of its members.137
 Although the NFA can bring a disciplinary action against one of its members, 
the NFA cannot enforce its insider trading laws against commodities exchange par-
ticipants.  The NFA’s Articles of Incorporation, Article III, section 2(a) provides: 
“No NFA requirement shall purport to govern or otherwise regulate the specific 
conduct of a Member or Association if such conduct is governed or regulated by the 
requirements of a contract market and such Member or Associate is subject to the 
contract market’s disciplinary jurisdiction for such conduct.”138  Section 2(b) further 
specifically provides that the NFA cannot regulate, among other things, “[t]he con-
131. Insider Trading Study, supra note 8, at app. VI 3–4.  The CFTC stated that the rules of the NFA, 
contained in its Code of Professional Conduct, prohibited NFA officers and employees from trading in 
futures without the approval of the president or general counsel.  Id.  Also, the Code of Professional 
Conduct prohibits officers and employees from using confidential information gained by reason of their 
employment for their personal benefit.  Id.
132. Calvary Financial Group LLC, NFA Case #02BCC00005, ID No. 0297789 (Nov. 13, 2002).
133. Id.
134. NFA Website, http://www.nfa.futures.org/aboutnfa/indexAbout.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
135. Id.
136. NFA Website, http://www.nfa.futures.org/news/newsActionsList.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2008). 
137. Telephone Interview with Thomas W. Sexton III, Vice-President & General Counsel, Nat’l Futures 
Ass’n (June 29, 2007) [hereinafter Sexton Telephone Interview].
138. NFA Articles of Incorporation, available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/manualArticles.
asp#A3S2.
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duct of business or other activities on the trading f loor of a contract market.”139  The 
NFA Articles, then, devolve authority over trading violations to the commodities 
exchanges.
 The CME and NYMEX, two of the most important commodities exchanges, 
do not have adequate rules in place to deter insider trading.  Under CME Rule 233, 
titled “Conflict of Interest—Disqualification,” the board must take “all necessary 
steps” to make sure that no board member has a conflict of interest.140  This rule 
states that such a board member will be excused from a meeting concerning a matter 
in which the board member has a “significant and direct financial interest.”  CME 
Rule 233 gives three examples of when a board member should be excused from a 
meeting: (1) when he directly or indirectly owns or controls an account likely to be 
materially affected by the board meeting; (2) when he has a substantial financial in-
terest in a clearing member likely to be materially affected by the board meeting; 
and, (3) when the board otherwise determines disqualification is necessary.141
 CME Rule 432(M), under the section for “Major Offenses,” states that it shall 
be a major offense “to use or disclose, for any purpose other than the performance of 
an individual’s official duties as a member of any committee or the Board of Directors, 
any nonpublic information obtained by reason of participating in any Board of 
Directors or committee meeting or hearing.”142  Under CME Rule 431 on penalties, 
major offenses warrant expulsion, suspension, and denial of access to CME products 
and/or a fine of up to $100,000 plus disgorgement of any ill-gotten gains.143
 CME Rule 532 provides: “No person shall disclose another person’s order to buy 
or sell . . . . No person shall take action or direct another to take action based on non-
public order information . . . . Violation of this rule may be a major offense.”144
 These rules are ineffective for the same reason the NFA rules are ineffective. 
Simply stated, they are not enforced.145  The rules banning employees from insider 
trading are contained within the employee handbook.146  In the CME employee 
handbook there is a provision titled “Insider Trading,” which prohibits the buying or 
selling of securities using material, non-public information.147  This prohibition, 
139. Id.
140. Sexton Telephone Interview, supra note 137.
141. Id.
142. CME Rulebook, available at http://www.rulebook.cme.com/Rulebook/Chapters/pdffiles/004.pdf.
143. Sexton Telephone Interview, supra note 137.
144. CME Rulebook, available at http://rulebook.cme.com/Rulebook/Chapters/pdffiles/005.pdf.
145. These rules were explained to me as being confidentiality rules, rather than insider trading rules. 
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Member of CME Market Regulation (July 5, 2007) [hereinafter 
Member Telephone Interview]. 
146. Id.




while applicable to securities, does not use the word “commodities.”148  The omission 
of the word “commodities” means that this insider trading rule only applies to secu-
rity-linked commodities products.149  In support of the CME enforcement program, 
the employee handbook provides: “You may not personally profit from confidential 
information.  You may not use confidential information to trade commodities or se-
curities for your own (or related) accounts . . . .”150
 It is unclear whether the CME has brought specific actions for insider trading 
pursuant to the employee handbook because the CME’s enforcement activity is not 
public.151  Even if the CME has enforced this guideline, the penalties for violating 
the handbook are unlikely to deter violations.  In the CME employee handbook, the 
section titled “Discipline for Violations,” provides that conduct not in compliance 
with the handbook may lead to disciplinary measures “up to and including 
discharge.”152  This is hardly a deterrent.  In comparison to insider trading in securi-
ties, where violators might serve jail time,153 the maximum penalty for insider trading 
on commodities is only discharge from the commodities exchange.
 The insider trading rules of NYMEX are similarly inadequate, as they closely 
follow CFTC Regulation 1.59.  Under NYMEX Rule 3.02, titled “Restrictions on 
Governing Board Members, Committee Members, Consultants, and Other Persons 
Who Possess Material, Non-Public Information,” the NYMEX adopts the same 
definitions for “material information” and “non-public information” as Regulation 
1.59.154  Also, NYMEX Rule 3.02 distinguishes between governing board members, 
committee members, consultants, and other persons with material, non-public infor-
mation, and places more stringent trading requirements on other persons.155
 The NYMEX rule is inadequate to block insider trading for the same reasons as 
described above.  NYMEX Rule 3.02 does not subject governing members to the 
same level of trading restrictions as employees.  In fact, NYMEX’s rule implements 
the minimal amount of trading restrictions required by Regulation 1.59.156
148. Id.
149. Member Telephone Interview, supra note 145.
150. CME, Employee Handbook, supra note 147, at 5–6.
151. Member Telephone Interview, supra note 145.
152. CME, Employee Handbook, supra note 147, at 14.
153. Martha Stewart, who was sentenced to five months incarceration, serves as an infamous example of an 
inside trader serving jail time.  See United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2006).
154. Compare NYMEX Exchange Rulebook 3.02 (2008) [hereinafter NYMEX Exchange Rulebook], 
available at http://www.nymex.com/rule_main.aspx?pg=3#3.02, with 17 C.F.R. § 1.59 (2008).
155. NYMEX Exchange Rulebook, supra note 154.
156. 17 C.F.R. § 1.59(b) (stating that self-regulatory organizations should have these rules in place “at a 
minimum”).
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IV. ANALYSIS
 A. The Ineffectiveness of Regulation 1.59 May Lead to a Less Competitive 
  Commodities Market
 The problems with the insider trading regulation rules and enforcement are out-
lined above.  First, section 6b of the CEA is not suited for insider trading claims, as 
are section10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, because the breach 
of fiduciary duty and misappropriation theories used in securities cases do not trans-
late in the commodities context.  CFTC Regulation 1.59 is ineffective because 
commodities trading by governing members is not restricted to the same degree as 
trading by employees.  Although the NFA possesses strong rules against insider 
trading, it simply does not enforce them.
 The CME and NYMEX, two of the most important commodities exchanges, 
also contribute to the ineffectiveness of Regulation 1.59.  In the case of the CME, 
the employee handbook governs insider trading.  The maximum punishment for vio-
lations is discharge from the exchange.  The NYMEX simply adopts Regulation 
1.59, which on its face and as interpreted by the CFTC in its adopting releases is 
wholly inadequate.
 Insufficient regulation of insider trading is problematic for two reasons.  First, 
the present state of insider trading regulation favors hedgers over speculators, which 
is dangerous to the efficiency of the commodities market.  Another problem with 
insufficient regulation is that insider trading is fundamentally unfair.
 B. The Present State of Insider Trading Regulation Favors Hedgers over Speculators
 The CFTC, in its 1984 Insider Trading Report, identified hedgers and specula-
tors as key market participants.157  As stated above, hedgers use futures to protect a 
cash market position from adverse price movements158 while speculators seek profit 
by anticipating changes in cash market prices.159  The insider trading study, while 
recognizing that futures markets facilitate the management of risk, also acknowl-
edges that speculators add the necessary liquidity to the market so that the futures 
market functions efficiently.160  The study states: “Whereas the futures market hedger 
seeks protection against unfavorable changes in cash market prices, the speculator 
willingly assumes the risk of futures price changes.”161
157. Insider Trading Study, supra note 8, at 13–14.
158. Id. at 13.
159. Id. at 14.
160. Id. at 13–14.
161. Id. at 14.  As one district court aptly noted, “Speculation in the futures markets can be undertaken only 
by those who stand ready to lose their entire investment and then some.”  Comex Clearing Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Flo-Arb Partners, 711 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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 In an article written by David T. Johnston,162 “Understanding the Dynamics of 
Commodity Trading:  A Success Story,” Johnston discusses the importance of specu-
lators to the commodity market.163  He argues that fifty to seventy-five percent of 
trading must come from speculators in order for the market to function efficiently, 
especially during the occasional times when dealers and commercial firms place very 
large orders.164  The consequence of less-liquid markets would increase the cost of 
moving raw materials from producer to consumer.165
 In U.S. v. Dial, the Seventh Circuit highlighted the dangers of insider trading 
and its possible effect on traders without material, non-public information.166  Writing 
for the court, Judge Posner noted that traders on commodities exchanges want assur-
ance that they are not competing with people who have preferential access to 
information.167  If these traders feel that others have an unfair advantage, they will 
seek out other exchanges that are not “rigged.”168
 C. Insider Trading Is Fundamentally Unfair
 In addition to ensuring that speculators remain key market participants, insider 
trading laws should be enforced because insider trading is inherently unfair.  Fairness 
in public trading, according to one academic commentator,169 requires that market 
participants have a roughly calculable chance to win170 and a level playing field.171
162. David T. Johnston, at the time he wrote the article in 1980, was senior vice president for commodities 
of E.F. Hutton and Co., chairman of the Futures Industry Association (FIA), vice president of the 
NFA, and a member of many commodity exchanges.  David T. Johnston, Understanding the Dynamics of 
Commodity Trading: A Success Story, 35 Bus. Law. 705, 705 (1980).
163. Id. at 705–10.
164. Id. at 709.
165. Id. at 709–10.  One interesting trend found in agricultural commodities was that the more liquid they 
were, the faster they grew.  For example, sugar futures and options, which enjoyed great liquidity, 
accounted for more than half of the increase of volume in trading on the NYBOT in 2004.  Galen 
Burghardt, FIA Annual Volume Survey: The Invigorating Effects of Electronic Trading, Futures Industry, 
Mar./Apr. 2005, available at http://www.futuresindustry.org/fi-magazine-home.asp?a=1026; see also 
Galen Burghardt, Measuring Market Impact: Transaction Cost Analysis Comes to the Futures Market, 
Futures Industry, Nov./Dec. 2006, at 62, available at http://www.futuresindustry.org/downloads/
fimag/2006/outlook07/outlook07_tca.pdf.
166. 757 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1985).
167. Id. at 165.
168. Id.
169. Kim Lane Scheppele, “It’s Just Not Right”: The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 
123, 157 (1993).
170. Under this theory, traders must be able to ascertain whether they are trading against insiders.  If they 
cannot make this determination, then the trader has no way to calculate his risk.  In order to determine 
whether there is insider trading, there must be disclosure.  Id. at 157–60.
171. In order to ensure fairness to the greatest extent possible, the market must be a level playing field.  This 
does not mean that all parties trading on the markets will have equal information.  A level playing field 
requires that all market participants have equal access to all pertinent information.  Id. at 160.
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 In the context of securities law, the fairness policy behind banning insider trading 
is endorsed by both the SEC and the Supreme Court.172  As stated above, the CFTC’s 
mission statement describes its main purposes as protecting against fraud and pro-
moting competition.173  The CFTC’s ineffectiveness in stopping insider trading 
demonstrates a failure to protect market users from abusive market practices.
 One of the biggest opponents to the fairness argument underlying insider trading 
laws is Professor Henry G. Manne.174  According to Professor Manne, economic in-
jury to outsiders is random.175  Professor Manne does not, however, solely rest his 
pro-insider trading position on the theory that economic injury to outsiders is 
random.  As he states, “the ultimate question of economic desirability of insider 
trading involves far more than these hypothetical computations.”176  Professor Manne 
asserts that a key factor in support of allowing insider trading is that it encourages 
innovation in the market.177  In order to encourage innovation, he argues, salary and 
bonuses are an inadequate form of compensation because “the employee is limited to 
a specific reward no matter how great his innovation.”178
 Arguments in support of insider trading must be rejected.  First, it is incorrect to 
assert that insider trading causes no economic harm in the markets.179  Some traders 
may feel, regardless of the economic effects, that insider trading is simply not right.180 
172. In United States v. O’Hagan, the Supreme Court stated that the “animating purpose” of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 was “to ensure honest securities markets.”  521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997).  Justice 
Ginsburg cited an SEC release from 1980 in support of this statement.  The SEC states, “The 
Commission continues to believe that [insider trading] undermines the integrity of, and investor 
confidence in, the securities markets . . . .”  Tender Offers, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,412 (Sept. 12, 1980) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
173. About the CFTC, supra note 68.
174. Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 
Hofstra L. Rev. 9, 10 n.4 (1984).  Macey states that Professor Manne’s work was the origin of the 
intellectual opposition to the fairness conception.  Id.
175. Manne states that in the case of a price increase, for example, while some outsiders may lose if they sell 
early, some outsiders may gain from increased insider trading activity if they hold.  Henry G. Manne, 
Insider Trading and the Stock Market 99–107 (1966).
176. Id. at 104.
177. For example, without allowing insider trading as a form of compensation, the director doing his job at 
the exchange is going to get his fixed salary regardless of whether he revolutionizes the industry or not. 
Id. at 132–33.
178. Id. at 138.  Manne states that the salary merely gets the person into the job.  The bonus paid to 
compensate entrepreneurs is usually paid out through a profit-sharing plan where a percentage of profits 
is determined in advance rather than as a result of a new discovery.  As opposed to seeing this as a 
windfall to the insider, Manne refers to this insider trading as a “rather inexpensive form of 
compensation.”  Id. at 107.
179. See generally William H. Painter, Rule 10b-5: The Recodification Thicket, 45 St. John’s L. Rev. 699 
(1971) (using insider trading as an example to examine whether rules should be made legislatively, 
administratively, or judicially).
180. Id. at 714.  Painter notes that whether this feeling is rational or irrational is not relevant:
   The problem with [Manne’s theory that the investing public consists of only those solely 
preoccupied with the economic effects of market regulation] is that investors do not concern 
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Although Professor Manne “characterizes this argument as little more than foot 
stomping,” this admittedly emotional reaction may have serious adverse economic 
consequences for the markets if enough people stomp their feet.181  Investors could 
lose confidence in the integrity of the markets and stop trading.182
 Professor Manne’s argument that entrepreneurs are not sufficiently compensated 
without insider trading is as dubious as his claim that insider trading causes no eco-
nomic harm in the market.  To argue that banning governing members from trading 
commodities will deter talented people from taking these positions is absurd in view 
of governing members’ actual salaries.183  The compensation offered by these posi-
tions is so great that plenty of talented people will seek out positions as governing 
members even if they are not allowed to trade in commodities.184
 In addition to traditional arguments against Professor Manne’s position, the 
1984 CFTC insider trading study criticizes Professor Manne’s position on insider 
trading.185  The study notes that Professor Manne’s theory is based on hypothetical 
conjecture, as it is not possible to correctly determine whether entrepreneurs are 
over- or under-compensated.186  In any case, the study notes that whatever force 
Professor Manne’s arguments may have in a securities context is lost in the futures 
context.187
 Admittedly, insider trading in the securities markets and insider trading in the 
commodities markets are two different things.  As set forth in the introduction, 
there is a fundamental difference between the two markets.  The CFTC noted three 
themselves exclusively with economic effects and are motivated by a wide variety of factors, 
many of which can only be described as irrational.
 Id. at 714 n.51.
181. Id. at 714 n.53.
182. Id. at 713–14.
183. As mentioned above, the CFTC noted in its 1986 release that several industry groups took this position 
including ALCOA, CME, NFA, the NYSE, and ten other groups.  See Activities of SRO Employees, 
supra note 117.
184. See id.
185. See Insider Trading Study, supra note 8, at app. IV–A 6–11.
186. The study states that there is no empirical evidence to support Manne’s view that entrepreneurs are 
undercompensated.  While recognizing that there are certainly some underpaid entrepreneurs, the 
CFTC stated, “there is no reason to expect them as a group to be systematically underpaid.”  Id. at 11.
187. Id. at app. IV-A 9.  Futures prices, unlike securities prices, very rarely f luctuate based on one firm’s 
performance.  Consequently, allowing an insider to trade on non-public information in the futures 
markets would not accurately compensate that person for their efforts.  Id. at app. IV-A 8.
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major categories of information that have value in futures trading: futures trading 
environment,188 transaction information,189 and cash market fundamentals.190
 Of the CFTC’s four enumerated categories of traders that may potentially en-
gage in insider trading, outlined above,191 governing members are in the unique 
position of having simultaneous access to information regarding the futures trading 
environment, transaction information, and cash market fundamentals.192 
Consequently, a strict ban on commodity futures trading by governing members 
would eliminate the potential for governing members to engage in insider trading.  A 
total ban would eliminate confusion surrounding what is non-public, what is mate-
rial, and what information was obtained as a result of their duties as a governing 
member.  The new rule would be crystal clear.  Instead of providing that no gov-
erning member “shall use or disclose—for any purpose other than the performance 
of official duties . . . material, non-public information obtained as a result of the per-
formance of such person’s official duties”193 the rule would be unambiguous like 
section 16(b) of the SEA.
V. CONCLUSION
 The commodities market is a key component to the success of the U.S. financial 
markets.  Like the securities market, maintaining public confidence in the com-
modities markets should be of paramount importance to commodity regulators.194 
Unfortunately, the current insider trading rules have the potential to undermine 
public confidence in the commodities markets.  Allowing governing members, who 
have informational advantages over other market participants, the opportunity to 
trade on inside information is unfair.195  If enough market participants, particularly 
188. Futures trading environment is defined as information regarding various market rules and regulations. 
See Insider Trading Study, supra note 8, at 16.
189. Transaction information is knowledge of the “past, current and/or anticipated cash or futures market 
transactions of a market participant.”  Id.
190. “Cash market fundamentals information” is information regarding changes in the supply or demand in 
commodities that underlie futures market transactions.  Id. at 17–18.
191. The CFTC identified four categories of potential inside traders: government employees, employees of 
futures SROs (this would include governing members), individuals who trade as agents, and employees 
of cash and futures firms.  See supra pp. 608–09.
192. By definition, governing members will have access to information regarding the futures trading 
environment because they are passing rules for their exchanges.  In addition, governing members, 
through their auditing of market participants and their surveillance of the futures markets, also have 
access to transaction information and cash market fundamentals.  Due to access to aggregated 
information, governing members consistently possess material, non-public information not available to 
other market participants.  Insider Trading Study, supra note 8, at 20–21, 85–86.
193. 17 C.F.R. § 1.59(c).
194. As noted above, section 16(b) provides an absolute ban on certain types of potential insider trading, and 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are used to sue those who engage in insider trading.  See supra Part III-B.
195. Governing members consistently have access to information regarding futures trading environment, 
transaction information, and cash market fundamentals.  See Insider Trading Study, supra note 6, at 
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speculators, leave the commodities market, decreased liquidity in the market will 
drive up transaction costs for the entire market.196
 To avoid these problems, the CFTC should redraft Regulation 1.59 to com-
pletely ban insider trading by governing members.  The goal of placating large 
regulatory bodies and corporations that animate Regulation 1.59 is unrealistic. 
Strong insider trading laws will not disincentivize talented people from serving in 
leadership positions on commodities exchanges.  Governing members of commodi-
ties exchanges enjoy great prestige and plenty of monetary compensation without the 
need to trade on inside information.
 The futures SROs should be responsible for ensuring that their governing mem-
bers do not trade.  However, because governing members have great influence over 
their exchanges, the CFTC also needs to play an active role in ensuring compliance 
with a new Regulation 1.59.  In order to make certain that the new regulation is ef-
fective, the CFTC Division of Market Regulation, not the futures SROs, should 
examine the procedures in place to prevent insider trading in their annual rule en-
forcement reviews.197  In addition, the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement should 
devote some of its resources specifically to investigating and enforcing against insider 
trading abuses.
36.
196. See Johnston, supra note 162; see also Burghardt, Measuring Market Impact, supra note 165.
197. See Div. of Mkt. Oversight, supra note 67, for more information on the Division of Market 
Regulation’s Rule Enforcement Reviews.
